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JURISDICTION
This is an Appeal from Appellant's Petition to Modify a
decree of divorce and Appellant's Petition for Judgment for
one-half of Appellee's net income for the years 1981 through
1989.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in accordance with

Utah Code Ann. 78-29-3(2) (h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Court was correct in ruling that Appellant's

request to terminate or reduce alimony was not supported by the
evidence.
2.

Whether the Court was correct in awarding judgment

against the appellant in the sum of $6,000.00, representing
accrued and unpaid alimony for November and December, 1989, and
January and February of 1990.
3.

Whether the Court was correct in ruling that appellant

voluntarily waived his right and he is estopped from now
enforcing his rights pursuant to the decree of divorce which
provides in part that alimony shall be reduced by one-half (1/2)
of appellee's net income earned and received from her employment,
if any.
4.

Whether Appellant's appeal should be adjudged frivolous

and whether sanctions should be imposed upon Appellant, including
award of double costs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicable standard of review for the issues presented
on appeal is as stated in the cases recited in Porco v. Porco,

752 P.2d 365 (Utah 1988), wherein this court recited favorably
the decision in Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d, 779, (Utah 1986) and King
v. King, 717 P.2d 715 (Utah 1986).. In the Gill case the Court
held that in order to overturn the trial Court's findings it must
be shown:
that the evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or that the trial court abused it's
discretion or misapplied the law, or that the
trial court's award works such a manifest injustice
as to show clearly an abuse of discretion.
In the King case the court held that:
the trial court is afforded considerable discretion,
and it's actions are cloaked with a presumption of
validity.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. 78-12-22. Within eight years.
An action upon a judgment or decree of any Court of
the United States or of any State or territory
within the United States.
An action to enforce any liability due or to become
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance
for dependant children.

2.

Rule 33, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure.
for delay or frivolous Appeal;
recovery of attorney's fees.

Damages

(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in
a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it
shall award just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable
attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the
party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is
one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument
to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the

purpose of delay or one interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request
of any party or upon its own motion. A party
may request damages under this rule only as
part of the appellee's motion for summary
disposition under Rule 10, as part the
appellee's brief, or as part a party's
response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion
of the court, the court shall issue to the party
or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded.
The order to show cause shall set forth the
allegations which form the basis of the damages
and permit as least ten days in which to respond
unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown.
The order to show cause may be part of the notice
of oral argument.
(3) If requested by party against whom damages
may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 3.
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
upon Oral Examination.

Deposition

(e) Submission to witness; changes; signing. When
the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition
shall be submitted to the witness for examination
and shall be read to or by him, unless such
examination and reading are waived by the witness
and by the parties. Any changes in form or
substance which the witness desires to make shall
be entered upon the deposition by the officer with
a statement of the reasons given by the witness for
making them. The deposition shall then be signed by
the witness, unless the parties by stipulation
waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot
be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is
not signed by the witness within 30 days of its
submission to him, the officer shall sign it and
state on the record the fact of the waiver or of
the illness or absence of the witness or the fact
of the refusal to sign together with the reason, if
any, given therefore; and the deposition may then
be used a fully as though signed unless on a motion
to suppress under Rule 32(d)(4) (Rule 32(c)(4) the

court holds that the reasons given for the refusal
to sign require rejection of the deposition in
whole or in part.
4.

Rule 52 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.
The motion may be made with a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact
are made in actions tried by the court without a
jury, the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be
raised whether or not the party raising the
question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings or has made either a
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a
motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Proceedings Below,
In March, 1989, Appellant Howard Hinckley (hereinafter

"Howard") filed a petition for modification requesting that the
Court reduce or terminate his alimony obligation to Appellee
Charlene Hinckley, (hereinafter "Charlene") and further
requesting the Court order Charlene to pay over to Howard
one-half of her net income earned and received from her
employment for the period from 1981 through 1989, as provided in
the decree of divorce.
Counterclaim.

Charlene filed an Answer and

The case was tried on March 21, 1990.

The court

rendered its Memorandum Decision on April 13, 1990, denying
Howard's petition to reduce or terminate alimony for the reason
that the evidence presented by Howard at the trial did not
support his request to terminate or reduce alimony.

The court

further ruled that Howard, by his words and actions had waived
his right to a reduction of his alimony payment by one-half of
Charlene1s net income, from the date of entry of the decree of
divorce in November, 1980 through March 21, 1990, the date of the
trial, and that Howard is therefore estopped from asserting those
rights.

The court further ordered that the decree of divorce may

be enforced by the parties in the future in accordance with its
terms.

The court also found that Howard had failed to pay his

court ordered support for the four (4) months immediately prior
to the trial, and Charlene was awarded judgment in the sum of
$6,000.00.

The court signed and entered it's Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and Judgment on April 30, 1990. Howard
filed an Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and
on May 8, 1990 Charlene filed a Response to Defendant's Objection
to Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law.

An Order denying

Howard's Objection was signed and entered on May 25, 1990.
2.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Charlene was granted a Decree of Divorce from Howard on

November 20, 1980. (R. 65). The decree ordered Howard to pay to
Charlene alimony in the amount of $1,200 per month to continue to
her death or remarriage, whichever occurs first.

The decree

further provides that alimony shall be reduced by one-half of the
net amount of (Charlene1s) net income earned and received from
her employment, if any. (R. 62) (emphasis added).
2.

At the time of the divorce, Charlene was awarded the

parties1 home, a duplex, and various items of personal property.

5

Howard was awarded the parties' income producing properties
including two (2) commercial buildings, an apartment building and
a vacant lot, in addition to various items of personal property.
(R. 62-65).
3. At the time of the divorce the parties owned and
operated 2 barber shops, with a total of 19 barber chairs, which
shops have been operated by Howard since entry of the decree of
divorce to the present. (Howard's Depo. 15).
4.

In 1984 Howard started a sun tanning business, and he

purchased sun tanning beds and related equipment financed by
Charter Thrift and Loan and Overland Thrift & Loan. (Plaintiff's
Trial Exhibits 7 & 8). Howard also invested $50,000.00 cash.
(Transcript 84) .
5.

Howard's monthly payments to Charter and Overland for

the sun tanning equipment totalled $3,597.64 per month.
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 7 & 8). Those contracts with Charter
and Overland have now been paid in full. (Transcript 106 & 107).
6.

For calendar year 1979 the parties' joint federal income

tax return shows an adjusted gross income of $34,852.00
consisting of a $44,923.00 Schedule "C" Profit from the parties'
barber shops and an $11,736.00 loss from the parties' apartment
rentals. (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12).
7.

After the divorce Charlene secured and retained

part-time employment with various employers from time to time.
Her income for calendar year 1988, 1987, 1986 is reflected in her

federal income tax returns. (Defendant's Trial Exhibits 3, 4, &
5).
8.

That at all times since entry of the decree of divorce,

Howard has had personal knowledge about the various jobs held by
Charlene, since the parties had almost continuous contact with
one another. (Transcript 131, 132, 134, 140).
9.

In March of 1987, Charlene lost her job with State

Mutual, at which time she made a decision to pursue a career as
real estate agent. (Transcript 143 & 144).
10.

For calendar year 1988 and 1989 Charlene had no net

income earned from her employment. (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 3).
11.

For calendar year 1986 Howard alleged his total income

to be $15,120.00; for 1987 he alleged his total income to be
$21,244.00; and for 1988 he alleged his total income to be
$23,186.00. (Defendant's Trial Exhibits 13, 14 & 15).
12.

Howard's net income for calendar year 1987 and 1988 is

artificially understated on Schedule "C" of his tax return in the
amount of $27,600.00 per year for loan payments to purchase sun
tanning equipment. (Defendant's Trial Exhibits 14 & 15, Schedule
"C").
13.

Howard testified that his gross income for calendar year

1989 from his various business interest increased by $8,996.00
over 1988, to $102,000.00. (Transcript 61).

Howard further

testified that during calendar year 1989, he no longer incurred
monthly payments on sun tanning beds, therefore, further
increasing his overall income over 1988 by an additional
$27,900.00. (Transcript 106 & 107).

14.

By his own testimony, Howard's projected total income is

substantialy greater for calendar year 1989 than it was at the
time of entry of the decree of divorce,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's ruling accurately reflects the evidence as
it was presented at the time of trial.

Howard's income for

support purposes has not decreased as alleged in his Petition for
Modification, but based on his testimony and documents h£
admitted at the time of trial, his income has increased from
$34,852.00 at the time of divorce, before a reduction for
alimony, to $52,096.00 for calendar year 1989. (1988 income of
$15,120.00 plus $8,996.00 increase in revenue, plus $27,900.00
payments for equipment he no longer incurs).

Therefore, there

has been no substantial change in circumstances "not anticipated
at the time of entry of the decree."
Additionally, it was anticipated at the time of entry of the
decree that :Lf Charlene had earned income independent of her
alimony, Howard would receive some benefit therefrom.

However,

the decree also provides that Charlene would receive alimony for
life, giving recognition to Charlene's advancing age, lack of job
skills, and limited ability to provide for her own support.
Charlene, relying on Howard's representations that he would
not require her to pay part of her earned income, made the
decision to pursue her interest in real estate sales on a
permanent basis.

One of her primary motivations for so doing was

her belief that this was a profession where her advancing age

would not be a detriment/ where she could compete with younger
persons, and where she could become more self sufficient.
Additionally Charlene indebted herself by selling her duplex and
investing the money to repair and remodel her home.
The income earned by Charlene subsequent to entry of the
decree of divorce up to the time of trial, not otherwise barred
by the statute of limitations, is not recoverable by Howard for
the reason that he knowingly and intentionally, by is words and
actions, waived his rights to those payments.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION IN DENYING
HOWARD'S PETITION TO REDUB0 OR TERMINATE ALIMONY
A.

There is nothing in the record which reflects any

material change in circumstances not anticipated at the time of
entry of the decree, warranting a reduction or elimination of
Howard's obligation for payment of alimony.
At the time of entry of the divorce decree the Court's
factual findings were that Charlene had not been gainfully
employed other than as a housewife for the previous ten (10)
years, except on a part-time temporary basis from time to time,
and because she was in need of support/ the court awarded alimony
in the sum of $1,200.00 per month until plaintiff's death or
remarriage.

The court further ruled that the alimony should be

reduced by one-half of plaintiff's net income earned and received
from her employment, if any.

(R. 53 & 54) (emphasis added).

The wording in the decree of divorce, consistent with the
findings of fact, shows the Court recognized that Charlene would
require financial assistance from Howard for the rest of her
life.

The purpose for alimony is to enable the receiving spouse

to maintain as closely as possible the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a
public charge.

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986).

Howard would ask this court to terminate alimony based solely
upon the sporadic part-time income Charlene has been able to
generate from time to time since entry of the decree of divorce.
Charlene who suffers from a degenerative disc, has menieris
disease, is deaf in her left ear, has arthritis in her hands,
feet and knees, and generally suffers alot of pain, is simply not
capable of supporting herself.

(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 1 ) .

The trial court was obviously convinced by Charlene's testimony
that due to her age (61 years) and her physical limitations it
was not possible for her to compete with younger workers in
today's very competitive job market.

(Transcript 37 & 144).

This was obvious when Charlene lost her clerical job at State
Mutual in March of 19 87, and when she was unable to locate other
suitable employment thereafter. (Transcript 143).
To obtain a modification of a decree of divorce the moving
party, Howard in this case, must show a substantial change of
circumstances not originally contemplated within the decree
itself. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P2d 393 (Utah 1985).

in

One

obvious aspect of the substantial change in circumstances
argument is that the trial court must be persuaded that the
person receiving support will be able to support herself at a
standard of living to which she was accustomed at the time of the
divorce, or that the party paying alimony, Howard in this case,
is no longer able to pay,

Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah

1988).
In this case, contrary to the allegations in his Petition
for Modification, and based on both the testimony and documentary
evidence produced at trial, Howard's ability to pay alimony have
increased substantially.

The parties pre-divorce 1979 joint

income from rental properties and operation of the two barber
shops was $34,852.00.

(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12).

Howard's total income for calendar year 1989, relying on
his documentary evidence and testimony alone, is $52,096.00.
According to Howard's testimony his 1989 business income
increased by $8,996.00, (Transcript 88-89); he no longer has
equipment purchase payments included in his 1988 tax return
in the amount of $27,900.00 (Transcript 106 & 107), which
added to his 1988 total income of $23,186.00 (Defendants Trial
Exhibit 15) brings Howard's total projected 1989 income to
$52,096.00. This in spite of the fact that all of his businesses
are heavily cash oriented and customers seldom if ever pay
other than with cash.

Furthermore, if the court disregards

both the income and expenses related to Howard's sun tanning
business, which is a business he started long after his divorce
from Charlene, and if the Court looks only at the income

generated from the assets and business ventures awarded at the
time of the divorce, his calendar 1988 income totals $52,982.00.
(1988 Schedule "C" income from barber shops, $42,453.00 plus
Schedule "E" apartment rental income, $10,529.00), rather than
the $23,186.00 reported on his tax return.

The $52,982.00 does

not even take into consideration the $8,996.00 increase in
business income he testified to for calendar year 1989.
The evidence regarding Charlene's financial circumstances is
such that her monthly expenses since entry of the decree of
divorce have increased from $2,267.00 per month at the time of
the divorce (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1) to $2,621.59.
The uncontested testimony of both Charlene (Transcript 136-140)
and Dayna Hinckley Atherly, the daughter of the parties, is that
Charlene's standard of living has declined significantly since
entry of the decree of divorce. (Transcript 124-126).
The case at bar is distinguished from the Haslam case cited
in Howard's brief in that Charlene has not demonstrated an
ability to support herself as was the case in Haslam.
Furthermore, Howard's income has increased substantially, which
also was not the case in Haslam.
(Utah App. 1990)

Haslam v. Haslam, 647 P.2d 257

Howard further cites Bridenbaugh v.

Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah 1983).

In Bridenbaugh the court

terminated alimony because the wife had secured a masters degree,
was purchasing a condominium, had accumulated $100,000.00 of
stocks and bonds, owned a cabin free and clear, had substantial

retirement benefits, and had a net worth of $221,200.00. Hardly
consistent with the facts in the case at bar.
In the case at bar, the only tangible assets Charlene owns
is the home in which she resides, a monthly contract payment from
the sale of a duplex awarded her at the time of the divorce, and
a small monthly payment from a limited partnership also awarded
at the time of the divorce.

The monthly payment received from

the contract is applied towards to cost incurred by Charlene in
partially remodeling and repairing her 30 year old residence.
Howard refers to "income producing assets" Charlene currently
owns.

These so called "income producing assets" are the same

duplex and limited partnership awarded to Charlene at the time of
the decree.

Furthermore, they produce very little income. The

fact that Charlene1s home may have increased in value, as
alleged, is no more relevant than the fact that Howard's
substantial real estate holdings may have increased in value over
the years. An increase in Charlene1s equity in her home does
nothing to generate income with which to sustain herself.
In those cases cited in Howard's brief where alimony was
terminated, the evidence showed that the receiving spouse had a
demonstrated ability to support herself.

In the case at bar,

Charlene's part time employment history, in addition to her lack
of training, advancing age, and physical disabilities does not
evidence an ability on her part either to retain permanent full
time employment or to earn a salary sufficient to support
herself.

Charlene simply is not capable of supporting herself.

The trial judge recognized that fact 10 years ago when he entered
the decree of divorce, and he recognized it again at the most
recent trial.
Howard on the other hand continues to own and operate two
extremely profitable barber shops with a total of 19 barbers
working for him, a sun tanning business, and several apartment
and commercial buildings.

All of Howard's businesses are heavily

cash oriented, making verification of his income difficult at
best, if not impossible, a fact which obviously did not escape
the trial judge.

Furthermore, Howard's refusal during discovery

to provide requested financial information is evidenced
throughout these proceedings.

Even after Charlene secured a

Court Order for Howard to produce documents, he refused to do so.
During his deposition, and in response to questions relating to
his failure to produce financial records, Howard testified as
follows:
Q.

(BY MR. DE JONGE); Alright. And now you know Judge
Sawaya so ordered you. Is it still your intention not
to provide that information?
"Yes" or "no." Is it your intention not to provide that
information to me?

A.

I don't know how to answer that.

Q.

Answer it "yes" or "no," yes I intend to or no I do not
intend to provide you the information.

A.

I haven't made up my mind.

Q.

Okay. That's a response. When can we count on you
having made up your mind about that?

A.

When I get good and ready.

Q.

And when might that be?
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A.

I don't know,

(Howard's Depo. 62 & 63).
Even given that difficulty, the record shows that Howard's income
is substantially more than he reported on his tax returns.
Howard would have the court believe that his total income
for 1986, 1987 and 1988 is substantially less than his total
income at the time of the divorce.

He would further ask the

court to believe his total personal income for calendar year 1987
and 1988, after payment of his alimony, was $6,457.00 and
8,285.00 respectively.

(Defendant's Trial Exhibits 14 & 15). at

that level of income, and after the payment of all business and
personal living expenses, how did Howard manage to increase his
checking account balance from January 1 to December 31, 1987 by
$7,500.00, and from January 1 to December 31, 1988 by an
additional $14,300.00. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 4 & 5).
Additionally, at the time of his deposition Howard testified that
a majority of his personal expenses were paid with cash taken
from business receipts and not deposited in his checking account
or reported on his tax returns. At the time of the deposition
Howard produced a listing of his alleged monthly expenses.
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 6).
In reviewing his monthly expenses at the deposition Howard
testified that he paid cash for his food, $300.00; clothing,
$50.00; auto and gas/repairs, $150.00; entertainment $200.00; and
medical expenses, $200.00. (Deposition 92-97).

Having previously

testified that all of his income was deposited into his checking

account, and that his federal tax returns were prepared from his
check registers/ Howard testified at the deposition as follows:
Q.

You have got to let me finish. Your tax return/ you
say is prepared strictly on your deposits. So how does
that get into your tax returns?

A.

It doesn't get in.

Q.

So the tax return doesn't reflect all of your income.

A.

Not every penny, no.

(Howard Depo. 96).
Howard further testified at his deposition as follows:
Q.

And your income and expenses you would say are
accurately reflected in these returns?

A.

Yes.

Q.

With the exception of presumably the money that you
previously testified to that you put into your pocket
for cash expenditures?

A.

Right.

Q.

That's not reflected in here?

A.

Right.

(Howard Depo. 106).
Although Howard's deposition was taken on November 30/ 1989
he failed to sign his deposition until March 21 f 1990f the
morning of the trial.

Over the objection of counsel for

Charlene, (Transcript 64 & 6 5 ) , the court allowed Howard to
change his original deposition testimony in open court and his
responses to the testimony on page 96 of his deposition was
changed as follows:
Q.

You have got to let me finish. Your tax return you
say is prepared strictly on your deposits. So how does

that get into your tax return?
A.

It doesn't get in.

Q.

So the tax return doesn't reflect all of your income.

A.

Not every penny, no.

Howard's revised answer for "It doesn't get in", is as follows:
A.

My tax returns are not prepared strictly on my deposits.
I keep a daily record of all receipts from my two barber
shops and the Sta-Tan operations and a monthly account
of my rental income. The accountant is given all of
these records and my checking account expenditures and
receipts for cash expenditures in compiling my tax
return.

(Transcript 68).
Howard's revised answer for "Not every penny, no" is as
follows:
A. The tax return reflects all of my income but it may not
reflect all of my cash business expenditures or expenses
if I fail to get a receipt.
(Transcript 69).
Howard's response on P. 106 of his deposition was changed as
follows:
Q.

And your income and expenses you would say are
accurately reflected in these returns?

A. Yes.
Q.

With the exception of presumably the money that you
previously testified to that you put into your pocket
for cash expenditures?

A.

Right.

Q.

That's not reflected in here?

A.

Right.

(Howard's Depo. 106).

Howards revised answer for "Right" was changed as follows:
A.

Some of the business expenses paid for with cash may not
be reflected, if I failed to get a cash receipt. All
income is reflected in my tax returns but not all of my
cash expenses.

Charlene would ask the court to suppress Howard's revised
response to those questions and consider only his response as
given at the time of his deposition.

As was recently decided in

Gaw v. State of Utah, 143 Utah Adv. Rept. 27, this court held
that changes to a deposition must be made in accordance with Rule
30(e) requiring that changes "be entered upon the deposition by
the officer with a statement of the reason given by the witness
for making them." (Utah Rule of Civ. Proc. 30(e).

This procedure

was not followed in the case at bar and the testimony of Howard
should stand as originally reported at the time of his
deposition.

Allowing Howard to change this critical deposition

testimony the morning of the trial, without Charlene having had
an opportunity to review that testimony and prepare to rebut it,
would work a great injustice upon her.
B.

Howard's suggests in his brief that the trial court

failed to make any findings regarding Charlene's standard of
living and her ability to provide for herself.
were not the central issues before the Court.

These, however,
The thrust of

Howard's Petition to Modify was that as a result of his alleged
reduced earnings, coupled with his desire to retire, he was no
longer able to pay the level of support previously ordered.
Putting aside his desire to retire, the record clearly shows that

his personal income generated from his various business
enterprises and rental properties has in fact increased
substantially since entry of the decree of divorce.
In Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1990) this court held
that:
To obtain a modification of a divorce decree the movant must
show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the
decree, that was not contemplated within the decree itself.
(emphasis added). Such is not the case here.

There is no

evidence other than some sporadic part-time jobs from time to
time that Charlene is capable of providing support for herself.
In Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct of Appeals 1988)
this court, in setting the standard which courts must follow in
order to reduce or terminate alimony, concluded that the trial
court:
must be persuaded that Appellant will be able to support
herself at a standard of living to which she was
accustomed during the parties marriage, or that Respondent
is not longer able to pay.
This however is a burden which Howard must bear in his Petition
for Modification.

The threshold requirement for relief is a

showing of a substantial change in circumstances occuring since
the entry of the decree not contemplated in the decree itself. In
it's ruling in the case at bar the trial court was obviously
impressed by the fact that Howard had not met his burden under
existing case law, when the trial judge recited in his findings
of fact that "Defendant's request to terminate or reduce alimony
is not supported by the evidence".

Howard further alleges that Charlene is living "far above
the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their
marriage" yet he can point to nothing in the record which
supports that conclusion. (Appellant's Brief 17 & 18). In fact
Charlene lives in the same house awarded to her at the time of
the divorce.

All she has done since the divorce is make some

improvements and repairs with monies she is receiving from the
contract sale of a duplex awarded to her in the original decree
of divorce. (Transcript 9).

Her primary basis for selling the

duplex and investing the proceeds into her present house was (1)
the assurance from Howard that he would not make demand for any
of Charlenefs net income from her employment, and (2) her
reliance upon Howard continuing to pay his present level of
alimony.

It is an absolute certainty that based upon the

evidence contained in the record and based upon Charlene1s
inability to compete in the job market and support herself, she
will become a public charge if Howard is not ordered to continue
his present level of alimony.
The Findings of Fact recited in the Judge Sawaya's Order and
Judgment should be upheld.

In Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996

(Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baughf 660 P2d 233 (Utah 1983)
this court ruled:
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all
material issues is reversable error unless the facts
in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable
of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment.
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The trial judge in the Hinckley case, being in the privileged
position of having presided over both the initial divorce trial,
and the trial on Howard's Petition for Modification, was
obviously convinced that the evidence and testimony were "capable
of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment."

In his

brief Howard cites Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121
(Utah App. 19 88) in support of his argument.

In Throckmorton,

however, the wife filed a petition for modification requesting an
increase in alimony.

That factual situation is significantly

different than the case at bar.

Additionally, Howard cites

Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988).

The Stevens

case was a divorce proceeding and the court was attempting to
address the issue of an initial award of alimony.
Throckmorton simply does not apply here.

Stevens, like

Howard is attempting to

shift the burden of proving a change in circumstances from
himself, the movant, to Charlene.
proof.

Howard has the burden of

A burden which he failed seriously to meet.
POINT II
HOWARD BY HIS WORDS AND ACTIONS WAIVED HIS RIGHT
TO HAVE HIS ALIMONY REDUCED BY ONE-HALF OF CHARLENEfS
PAST NET INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT.

The decree of divorce provides that Howard1s alimony shall
be reduced by one-half of Charlene's net income earned and
received from her employment, if any.

The evidence at trial

showed Charlene did earn some income.
After the the divorce, it became standard procedure for
either Charlene or Dayna, her daughter, to personally go to
Howard's business and pick up Charlene1s ali

support check (Transcript 20, 128 & 129). On many of those
occasions the parties would discuss Charlene1s employment, if she
was so employed at the time.

(Transcript 44). Howard, however,

never asked, therefore, Charlene never discussed with him, her
income from her part-time employment from time to time.
(Transcript 45, 140). Furthermore, Howard never objected to
Charlene earning some extra income or for having to pay his court
ordered alimony. (Transcript 45). Neither Charlene nor her
daughter Dayna ever made any attempt to hide from Howard the fact
that Charlene worked from time to time.

In fact Howard

frequently inquired about Charlene1s work, and it was not unusual
for Howard to visit Charlene at her employment (Transcript 45,
131, 134).
On one particular occasion in the fall of 1984 or the spring
of 1985 Dayna went to her father's barber shop to pick up her
mother's alimony check.

(Transcript 129 & 130). When she

arrived and received the check she observed that the check was
$200.00 short, which $200.00 was the amount due for child support
for Brent, one of the children of the parties.

When Dayna

inquired about the shortage, Howard advised her that because
Charlene owed him money, because she was working, he felt they
were even. (Transcript 130 & 131). That same day, after Dayna
returned home, she told Charlene what Howard had said.
(Transcript 132 & 133). Dayna further testified that Charlene's
response when told what Howard had said was one of relief.
(Transcript 133, 142, 143).
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In reliance on Howardfs assurances that he would not hold
Charlene responsible for monies otherwise due him per the decree
of divorce, Charlene sold the duplex she had been awarded in the
divorce, indebted herself to perform some repairs and remodeling
on her home, and when she lost from her job at State Mutual in
March of 1987, Charlene made the decision to permanently pursue
her career in real estate sales. (Transcript 144 & 145). Contary
to Howard's testimony, at no time, until December of 1988 did
Howard ever ask Charlene how much money she was earning, nor did
he ever inquire about being re-paid any amounts as provided in
the decree of divorce* (Transcript 133, 134, 142). In fact as
late as December, 19 88, immediately before he finally did make an
demand for payment, Howard told Charlene that although he didn't
mind paying her alimony, he wanted Charlene to work for it by
managing his apartments.

Charlene responded that although she

didn't mind managing his apartments she did not have to do it in
order to receive her alimony.

(Transcript 141).

This court recently decided a case very similar to the case
at bar.

In the case of Burrows v. Vrontikis, 129 Utah Adv. Rep.

44, this court held that Burrows, the mother of a small child
born out of wedlock to the parties, was estopped from attempting
to collect child support arrearages which had accumulated over a
period of approximately 7 years.

In the Burrows case Burrows had

told a mutual friend of the parties, by the name of Snape, that
she never wanted to see Vrontikis again.

Snape, told Vrontikis

what Burrows had said. Relying on what Snape had said, Vrontikis

had no further contact either with Burrows or the child.
Vrontikis later married and incurred various financial
obligations.

In it's decision, this Court defined the concept of

estoppel as follows:
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes
parties from asserting their rights where their actions
render it inequitable to allow them to assert those
rights. Estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1)
a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with later-asserted claim; (2) the
other party's reasonable action or inaction based upon
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure
to act; and (3) injury to the* second party that would
result from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate its statement, admission, act, or failure to
act.
In Burrows, this Court held that Burrows' seven year delay
in demanding respondent pay child support was unreasonable; that
Burrows knew or should have known that her remarks to Snape would
be conveyed to Vrontikis; that Vrontikis reasonably relied on
Burrows1 failure to take any action; and that as a result of this
reliance, Vrontikis assumed other obligations.
The facts in Burrows mirror the facts in the case at bar, in
that

(a) Howard has delayed approximately 9 years in his demand

that Charlene pay a portion of her net income from her
employment; in fact part of the income she earned is now barred
by the statute of limitations; (b) Howard knew or should have
known when he told Dayna Hinckley Atherly, that as far as he was
concerned, he and Charlene were even, that Dayna would relay that
information to her mother; (c) because of what Dayna told her,
Charlene did not pay Howard his share of her net income from

her part-time employment; and (d) Charlene relied on Howard's
statements as told to her by Daynar and in reliance, Charlene
sold her duplex, invested the proceeds to make some repairs and
do some remodeling of her home, and rather than attempting to
locate a clerical job, Charlene chose to make a commitment to her
profession in real estate sales.
Howard quotes the Hunter case, in his brief for the
proposition that a party's inaction alone is not sufficient for a
finding of waiver or estoppel.

The Hunter case, however, is

clearly distinguishable because it did not present the factual
circumstances present in either the Burrows case or the case at
bar.

The Hunter Court held that "a finding of estoppel only on

appellant's silence and failure to act was in error".

In the

case at bar, however, we have several additional factors for the
court's consideration.

Howard told Dayna Hinckley Atherly that

as far as he was concerned they were even.

Knowing full well

that she would do so, Dayna conveyed that information to her
mother.

Charlene in reliance on Howard's representation, sold

her duplex, incurred significant debt by making repairs and
remodeling her home, and made a career choice to work full time
as a real estate agent.

These acts of reliance are significantly

more than the facts presented in the Hunter case and "the
pleasant and euphoric assumptions" referred to in the Baggs case
cited in Appellant's brief. (Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P2d (Utah
1974) .
Howard further relies on French v. Johnson, 401 P. 2d 315
(Utah 1965).

In French the appellant had simnlv Hoor> ,q-Mo.»-~— ,•-

requesting child support payments.

Holding that alone was not

sufficient, the Court in French stated that "The facts show no
representation either explicit or implicit by plaintiff to
defendant with respect to discontinuation of payments,.... " (Id
at 315-16).

Howard's silence in requesting payment from Charlene

is but one of the factors present and relied upon in the case at
bar.

All of the factors this Court considered controlling in

Burrows are present in the Hinckley matter, including Charlene1s
detrimental change in position raised in Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d
147 (Utah 1979) cited in Howard's brief.
In his brief Howard asserts that

!,,

The decree did not confer

upon Howard a duty to speak, but rather conferred such a duty
upon Charlene." (Appellant's Brief 27). A review of the decree
shows that the decree is silent on that point, and that assertion
in Howard's brief is an obvious misrepresentation.
CONCLUSIONS
Charlene Hinckley requests that this court uphold the Order
and Judgment entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya in all
respects.

Charlene Hinckley further requests that due to

Howard Hinckley's substantial earning capacity and ability to
pay, that Charlene Hinckley be awarded an order requiring Howard
Hinckley to reimburse her costs and attorney's fees incurred in
this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of October,^1990.
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